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1 Introduction
The random assignment problem has recently been extensively investigated after the
seminal paper by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] (see, e.g., [3,4,7,12,18–20,23,24,
27–29,40]). In the present paper we show how these results on the random assign-
ment problem and its extensions can be viewed from submodular optimization for the
fair (or egalitarian) allocation problems with convex separable utility functions and
submodular constraints [30,16,21,10,26] considered some decades ago.
We first consider the problem of allocating divisible goods to agents, having util-
ity functions and submodular constraints on goods, in a fair manner without money.
Related non-pricing allocation schemes have been investigated for the random as-
signment problem with ordinal preferences in [3,5,4,7,12,23,24,27–29] and for al-
location problems with lexicographic preferences in [38,40]. These results have not
been extended to allocation problems with utility functions without money in gen-
eral, which seems to remain open as mentioned in [40]. We propose a non-pricing
allocation scheme of divisible goods to agents with utility functions and submodular
constraints on goods and examine our non-pricing allocation scheme in detail.
We then show that the probabilistic serial mechanism of Bogomolnaia andMoulin
[5] and its extensions [24,27,28,18–20] can be interpreted as special cases of our
scheme given here for appropriately chosen utility functions. This reveals the close
relation between (i) the optimal fair allocation problem and its solution algorithms in
[30,16,21,10,26] and (ii) the probabilistic serial mechanisms in [5,24,27,28,18–20]
and others, which seems to be worth further investigating. The results of the present
paper furnish further insights into the behavior of the probabilistic serial mechanism
and reveal the combinatorial structures that really validate it.1
The present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some preliminaries
on polymatroids and submodular optimization from [17] and describes the allocation
problem to be considered in this paper. In Section 3 we propose a non-pricing allo-
cation scheme as Simultaneous Monotone Algorithm and examine the solution in
detail, including the case when we allow indifference on goods. Section 4 discusses
implications of our non-pricing allocation scheme in the probabilistic serial mecha-
nisms of Bogomolnaia and Moulin and its extensions and reveals the close relation
between them and our non-pricing allocation scheme. Finally, Section 5 gives some
concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries and Problem Description
LetN andE be finite sets of agents and goods, respectively. For any e 2 E define e
to be the unit vector inRE such that e(f) = 1 if f = e and e(f) = 0 if f 2 Enfeg.
For any vector x 2 RE and any set F  E define xF = (x(e) j e 2 F ) 2 RF , the
restriction of x on F .
1 It should, however, be noted that the advantage of the random assignment problem with the proba-
bilistic serial mechanism is that we need only agents’ preferences but not their utility functions which are
expensive or hard to identify in practice.
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2.1 Polymatroids and independent flows
We assume that we are given a polymatroid (E; ) on E with rank function  : 2E !
R0. By definition, rank function  satisfies
(1) (normalization) (;) = 0,
(2) (monotonicity) for any X;Y  E with X  Y we have (X)  (Y ),
(3) (submodularity) for anyX;Y  E we have (X)+(Y )  (X[Y )+(X\Y ).
The submodular polyhedron P() associated with a polymatroid (E; ) is given by
P() = fx 2 RE j 8X  E : x(X)  (X)g; (1)
where x(X) =
P
e2X x(e) for any X  E. The intersection of P() and the non-
negative orthant RE0 is called the independence polytope associated with (E; ) and
is denoted by P(+)(). The base polytope B() associated with polymatroid (E; )
is given by
B() = fx j x 2 P(); x(E) = (E)g; (2)
which is always nonempty and is contained in the nonnegative orthantRE0 and hence
B() is also a face of P(+)() (see [17] for more details about polymatroids and
submodular functions).
We give some basic definitions of terms related to polymatroids that will be used
in the sequel (also see [17]).
– For any set F  E define F : 2EnF ! R0, the contraction of  by set F , by
F (X) = (X [F ) (F ) for allX  E nF , which gives another polymatroid
(E n F; F ) on E n F , the contraction of (E; ) by F .
– For any vector z 2 P(+)() define z : 2E ! R0, the contraction of  by
vector z, by z(X) = minf(Y )  z(Y ) j Y  Xg for all X  E, which gives
another polymatroid (E; z) on E, the contraction of (E; ) by z. Note that for
any y 2 RE0, we have y 2 P(+)(z) if and only if y + z 2 P(+)().
– For any  2 R with 0    (E) define ()(X) = minf(X); g for all
X  E, which is called the truncation of  by  . (E; ()) is also a polymatroid.
– Given any x 2 P(), a set X  E is called x-tight if x(X) = (X). The family
of x-tight sets is closed with respect to set union and intersection, so that there
exists a unique maximal x-tight set, which we denote by sat(x). The function
sat : P()! 2E is called the saturation function.
– Define a function dep : B() E ! 2E by
dep(x; e) = ff 2 E j 9" > 0 : x+ "(e   f ) 2 B()g
for all x 2 B() and e 2 E, which is called the dependence function for (E; ).
Note that dep(x; e) is the unique minimal x-tight set containing e 2 E.
Consider a (directed) graph G = (V;A) with a vertex set V and an arc set A,
which has a set S+ of entrances and a set S  of exits, where S+ and S  are disjoint
subsets of V (see Figure 1). Each arc a 2 A has a capacity c(a) > 0 and we also
have a polymatroid P+ = (S+; +) on set S+ of entrances and another polymatroid
P  = (S ;  ) on set S  of exits. Denote the present network by N = (G =
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Fig. 1 An independent-flow network.
(V;A); S+; S ; c;P+ = (S+; +);P  = (S ;  )). A function ' : A ! R is
called an independent flow in N if it satisfies
0  '(a)  c(a) (8a 2 A); (3)
@'(v) = 0 (8v 2 V n(S+[S )); @+' 2 P(+)(+); @ ' 2 P(+)( ); (4)







'(u; v) (8v 2 V ) (5)
and @+' 2 RS+ and @ ' 2 RS  are defined by
@+'(v) = @'(v) (8v 2 S+); @ '(v) =  @'(v) (8v 2 S ): (6)
(See [15,17].) Also note that the model of independent flows is equivalent to that of
submodular flows by Edmonds and Giles (see [17, Sect. 5]).
Concerning independent flows, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Let P  RA be the set of all independent flows in a network N =
(G = (V;A); S+; S ; c;P+ = (S+; +);P  = (S ;  )). If the capacity function
c and the rank functions  are integer-valued, then P is an integral polyhedron.
Moreover, disregarding the polymatroid P+ = (S+; +), we have the following.
Proposition 2 Let PS+  RS+ be the set of @+' for all ' 2 RA satisfying (3) and
@'(v) = 0 (8v 2 V n (S+ [ S )); @+' 2 RS+0 ; @ ' 2 P(+)( ): (7)
Then there uniquely exists a polymatroid (S+; ^) on S+ such that PS+ = P(+)(^).
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The polymatroid (S+; ^) on S+ appearing in Proposition 2 is called the polyma-
troid induced on S+ byP  = (S ;  ) through network N = (G = (V;A); S+; S ;
c;P  = (S ;  )).
2.2 Model description
We assume that we have a set of available good vectors x 2 RE0 that forms the base
polytope B() of a polymatroid (E; ) onE with rank function  : 2E ! R0. Also,





which agent i wants to minimize. Here we treat convex functions to be minimized
instead of concave functions to be maximized just as a matter of taste, without loss
of generality. We will use the term, utility, instead of disutility in the sequel for sim-
plicity. (We will also see in Section 4 that the minimization model fits better when
we discuss its relation to the serial mechanism of the random assignment problem of
Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5].) We also assume for simplicity that each uie is increas-
ing and strictly convex on [0;+1) and is differentiable on (0;+1). Let uie0 be the
derivative of uie on (0;+1). Note that by the assumption the set fuie0() j  > 0g is
an open interval, which we denote by ((i;e)0 ; 
(i;e)
1 ) where 
(i;e)
0  0 and (i;e)1 > 0




0 if 0    (i;e)0
 if  = uie
0() for  > 0
+1 if (i;e)1  
(9)
for all  2 [0;+1). Note that the restriction of (uie0) 1 on ((i;e)0 ; (i;e)1 ) is the
inverse of uie
0 on (0;+1). We assume that we can compute (uie0) 1() in unit time
for each  2 [0;+1).
It should be emphasized that we do not allow addition of utility functions ui and
uj of distinct agents i; j 2 N (i.e., the utilities are not transferable) though the utility
functions are defined on the common space of goods where we allow addition of good
vectors.
Define 0 = (E)=jN j, which is the same (common) amount of goods for each





xi(e)) = 0 (8i 2 N);
X
i2N
xi 2 B(); (10)
where xi = (xi(e) j e 2 E) 2 RE0 denotes a good vector that agent i 2 N receives.
Each agent i 2 N wants to minimize the objective functionPe2E uie(xi(e)) under
the overall interrelated constraints (10) for all agents.
6 Satoru Fujishige et al.
A feasible allocation x = (xi(e) j i 2 N; e 2 E) can be identified with an inde-
pendent flow ' : N  E ! R0 in a network N = (G=(V;A); S+=N;S =E; d;
(E; )), where V = N [ E, A = N  E, and d(i) = 0 (8i 2 N), such that
'(i; e) = xi(e) for all i 2 N and e 2 E. (See Figure 2.)
























Fig. 2 A feasible allocation as an independent flow '.
3 Monotone Algorithms
We propose a scheme of finding a “fair” feasible allocation of goods to agents under
the constraints of (10) without money.
SupposeN = f1;    ; ng. We introduce some definitions and notation to be used
for our algorithms given below. For each i 2 N define xi = ((uie0) 1() j e 2 E)
for all   0. For any   0, F  E, and i 2 N define (i; F; ) to be the value of
 satisfying X
e2F
xi(e) = : (11)
Note that (i; F; ) for each   0 is well-defined since xi(e) is continuous and
increasing in  2 [0; (i;e)1 ) and takes on all nonnegative reals. Also note that for any
real   0 equation (11) implies 0  xi(e) < +1 for all e 2 F , and we have
uie
0(xi(e)) =  (the common value (i; F; ) of derivatives) for all e 2 F .
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3.1 A known result for the case of a single agent
When there is only one agent, e.g.,N = f1g, there is no game-theoretic situation and





subject to x 2 B(): (12)
(Actually, Problem P1 was originally considered as a fair allocation problem of a
single commodity to multiple agents, withE being the set of agents.) It is known ([17,
Sect. 9],[22]) that the following algorithm gives an optimal solution of Problem P1.




Input: Problem P1 with a polymatroid (E; ) and a separable convex function u1 :
RE0 ! R.
Output: An optimal solution x of P1.
Step 0: Put x  0 2 RE , k  0, 0  0, and S0  ;.
Step 1: Compute
k+1 = maxf  k j xEnSk 2 P(+)(Sk)g: (13)
Put x(e) xk+1(e) for each e 2 E n Sk and Sk+1  sat(x).
Step 2: If Sk+1 6= E, then put k  k + 1 and go to Step 1.
Otherwise return x.
—————————————————————————————————–
By the procedure Single Monotone Algorithm we get a solution x and a se-
quence of x-tight sets
; = S0  S1      Sk+1 = E; (14)
where k is the finally obtained index k. Moreover, we can easily show that
– for any distinct e; f 2 E such that f 2 dep(x; e), if we have f 2 Sk n Sk 1,
then e 2 E n Sk 1, which implies u1e 0(x(e))  u1f 0(x(f)).
(Recall the definition of the dependence function dep in Section 2 and note that e 2
Sk implies dep(x; e)  Sk.) This guarantees the optimality of the solution x.
Theorem 1 ([16,17,22]) The procedure Single Monotone Algorithm computes an
optimal solution x of Problem P1.
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A special case where u1e(z) =
1
w(e)z
2 with positive weights w(e) for all e 2 E
was considered in [16], which shows the monotone algorithm and a characterization
of the unique optimal solution as follows. For any vector x 2 RE0 let Tw(x) be
a linear arrangement of x(e)=w(e) (e 2 E) in the non-decreasing order of mag-
nitude. That is, Tw(x) = (x(e1)=w(e1);    ; x(em)=w(em)) that satisfies E =
fe1;    ; emg and x(e1)=w(e1)      x(em)=w(em). We call a solution x 2 B()
a lexicographically optimal base with respect to the weight vector w if Tw(x) is
lexicographically maximum among linear arrangements Tw(y) for all y 2 B().
(Megiddo [30] considered a special case when w(e) = 1 for all e 2 E for a poly-
matroid of network type, induced on a set E of exits in a flow network. Also Gallo,
Grigoriadis, and Tarjan [21] presented an efficient parametric algorithm for a poly-
matroid of network type with general positive weights as in [16].)





2, the output x of the procedure
Single Monotone Algorithm is the unique lexicographically optimal base with re-
spect to the weight vector w.
Informally speaking, the lexicographically optimal base x is the one within the
base polytope B() that is as proportional to w as possible. The (equivalent) solution
is re-discovered by Dutta and Ray [10] as a (weighted) egalitarian solution (also see
[25,26]).
3.2 The case of multiple agents
Now let us consider the case of multiple agents, i.e., N = f1;    ; ng with n  2.
We carry out the procedure Single Monotone Algorithm simultaneously as fol-




Input: A set N of agents, a polymatroid (E; ), and separable convex functions ui :
RE0 ! R for all i 2 N .





Step 0: Put k  0, 0  0, S0  ;, and xi  0 2 RE for each i 2 N .
Step 1: Putting Fk = E n Sk, compute
k = max








For each i 2 N and e 2 Fk put xi(e) xi(i;Fk;k)(e).





Step 2: If Sk+1 6= E, then put k  k + 1 and go to Step 1.
Otherwise return (xi j i 2 N).
—————————————————————————————————–
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It should be noted that for each i 2 N the sequence of (i; Fk; k) for k =
0; 1; : : : is monotone increasing, i.e.,
0  (i; F0; 0) < (i; F1; 1) <    (8i 2 N) (16)
and that the output (xi j i 2 N) satisfies
xi(E) = 0( (E)=jN j) (8i 2 N); (17)X
i2N
xi 2 B(): (18)
For the output x  (xi j i 2 N) of Simultaneous Monotone Algorithm










 and zi is the contraction of  by vector z
i
. It should be
noted that Problem Pi(x) is to find an optimal solution for agent i to choose from
among B(zi). In other words, if all the agents j 2 N nfig other than i have received
goods xj (j 2 N n fig) and agent i can look for an optimal allocation within a setD
of good vectors available for agent i, then the set D is the base polytope B(zi).
Hence we have the following theorem based on the procedure Single Monotone
Algorithm and Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 For the output x  (xi j i 2 N) of Simultaneous Monotone Algo-
rithm, for each i 2 N the allocation xi is an optimal solution of Problem Pi(x) in
(19).
For each i 2 N define a vector yi 2 RE with a parameter   0 by
yi(e) =
(
xi(i;Fk;)(e) if e 2 Sk+1 n Sk;  = (i; Fk; ) for 0    k;
xi(i;Fk;k)(e) if e 2 Sk+1 n Sk;  > (i; Fk; k)
(20)
for all e 2 E, where recall the definition of (i; F; ) by (11). Put i = (i; Fk ; k)
where k is the finally obtained index k. Then yi 2 RE with parameter 0    i
defines a parametric continuous increasing curve for each agent i 2 N .
For each i 2 N and any  with 0    0(= (E)=jN j) define i() to be the
value  satisfying yi(E) =  .
From Theorem 3, we can show the following.
Theorem 4 For any  with 0    (E), (yii(=jN j) j i 2 N) coincides with the
output of Simultaneous Monotone Algorithm for the input polymatroid given by
the truncation (E; ()) of (E; ) by  , where ()(E) =  .
(Proof) The procedure Simultaneous Monotone Algorithm generates the same in-




i( 0=jN j)(E) becomes equal
to  when  0 =  . Hence the proof completes. 2
10 Satoru Fujishige et al.
Theorem 4 means that for each given total amount   0 of supplies the pro-
cedure Simultaneous Monotone Algorithm gives the incrementally best solution
for every agent for total amount ( +)=jN j of supplies with a sufficiently small
increment > 0.
3.3 Allowing indifference on goods
In this subsection we consider the case when there exists a collection E i of sets of
indifferent goods for each agent i 2 N . That is, E i is a partition fEi1;    ; Eikig of E







where ui` (` = 1;    ; ki) are increasing, differentiable, convex functions. Note that
distinct goods e; f 2 Ei` for ` 2 f1;    ; kig are indifferent for agent i 2 N and
the utility depends on the total amount x(Ei`) =
P
e2Ei` x(e) but not on individual




`(x(e)) having the same utility function u
i
` for all
e 2 Ei`. This is modeled as an independent flow problem as follows (see [17] and
Figure 3). Let G = (V;A) be a graph with a vertex set V and an arc set A given by
V = N [ E [W; (22)
W = fvi` j i 2 N; ` 2 f1;    ; kigg; (23)
A = B1 [B2; (24)
B1 = f(i; vi`) j i 2 N; ` 2 f1;    ; kigg; (25)
B2 = f(vi`; e) j i 2 N; ` 2 f1;    ; kig; e 2 Ei`g: (26)
Set N is the set of entrances and E is the set of exits. We have a polymatroid P =
(E; ). Let' : A! R be an independent flow in the networkN = (G=(V;A); S+=N;
S =E; c; d=(0 j i 2 N); (E; )) satisfying
(a) 8a 2 A : 0  '(a) < c(a) = +1 (a sufficiently large number),
(b) 8v 2W : @'(v) = 0,
(c) 8i 2 N : @+'(i)  d(i) and @ ' 2 P(+)().
(See Figure 3.)
Every feasible allocation (xi j i 2 N) with xi 2 RE0 is given by an independent
flow ' in N with @ ' 2 B() as
xi(e) = '(vi`; e) (i 2 N; e 2 Ei`; ` 2 f1;    ; kig): (27)




















































Fig. 3 An independent-flow network.
Now, for any independent flow ' in N define x' 2 RW by
x'(w) = '(i; v
i
`) (w = v
i
`; i 2 N; ` 2 f1;    ; kig): (29)
Then, from Proposition 2 we have the following.
Corollary 1 The polymatroid (E; ) defined on the set E of exits induces a polyma-
troid onW through the subgraph H = (W [ E;B2) with vertex setW [ E and arc
set B2 in (26), whose independence polytope is given by
PW = fx' j ' is an independent ow in Ng: (30)
Denote by (W; ^) the induced polymatroid in Corollary 1. It follows from (28)–
(30) that our problem becomes equivalent to the original allocation problem with set
N of agents, set W of “goods”, set PW = P(+)(^) of available “good” vectors,
and utility functions (28) and without indifference. Consequently, we can employ the
extended probabilistic serial mechanism shown in Section 3.2 to obtain a solution
when allowing indifference. Here, every “good” is regarded as a bundle of original
goods. A more general Leontief model (but with lexicographic preference orders) is
considered by Schulman and Vazirani [40].
Moreover, it should be noted that the subgraph H in Corollary 1 is a bipartite
graph but we can deal with a general graph H^ = (V^ ; A^) having the setW of entrances
and the set E of exits withW [E  V^ and having capacities of arcs in A^. Similarly
as in Corollary 1 a polymatroid (W; ^) is induced on W from polymatroid (E; )
on E. It should also be noted that for the random assignment problem, matroids of
network type are considered in [7], where the underlying graph represents laminar
constraints onW .
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4 The Random Assignment Problem Viewed from Submodular Optimization
In this section we examine our allocation scheme and reveal its relation to the proba-
bilistic serial mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] and its extensions [27,18,
19].
4.1 Relation to the probabilistic serial mechanism
Recently the probabilistic serial mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] has been
extended from the original random assignment problem to that with polymatroidal
constraints on multiple goods [18,19]. In this subsection we reveal that the proba-
bilistic serial mechanism and its extensions can be interpreted as special cases of the
procedure Simultaneous Monotone Algorithm given in Section 3.
We are given a polymatroid (E; ) with integer-valued rank function . Suppose
that each agent i 2 N has an ordinal preference list
Li : ei1 i    i eim; (31)
where fei1;    ; eimg = E and ei1 is agent i’s best (top) good. Under the preference
profile L = (Li j i 2 N) each agent i considersm-tuples
(xi(ei1); x
i(fei1; ei2g);    ; xi(fei1;    ; eimg)) (32)
for all (real-valued, expected) allocations xi to agent i. Here, note that in the random
assignment problem setting available good vectors are integer-valued, while by con-
sidering a lottery we have an expected real-valued allocation (xi j i 2 N), which
corresponds to a feasible flow in the independent-flow network N defined in Sec-
tion 2. The (first-order) stochastic dominance relation di over (real-valued) alloca-
tion xi is defined by the partial order induced by the component-wise order  on R
over m-tuples of (32). The (extended) serial mechanism to choose an efficient and
envy-free solution with respect to the stochastic dominance is given as follows (pa-










Input: A random assignment problemRA = (N;E;L; d; (E; )).
Output: A random assignment matrix P 2 RNE0 .
Step 0: For each i 2 N put xi  0 2 RE (the zero vector), and x  0 2 RE .
Put S0  ;, k  1, and 0  0.
Step 1: For current (updated) L = (Li j i 2 N), using b(L) in (33), compute
k = maxf  0 j x + b(L) 2 P(+)()g:
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For each i 2 N put xi  xi + kd(i)ei1 .
Put x  x + kb(L) and Sk  sat(x).
Step 2: Put Tk  Sk n Sk 1.
Update Li (i 2 N) by removing all elements of Tk from current Li (i 2 N).
Step 3: If (Sk) < (E), then put k  k + 1 and go to Step 1.
Otherwise ((Sk) = (E)) put P (i; e) xi(e) for all i 2 N and e 2 E.
Return P .
—————————————————————————————————–
PutM = maxf(feg) j e 2 Eg.
Now, reflecting the ordinal preference Li in (31) of every agent i, suppose that






0(M) (8` 2 f1;    ;m  1g); (34)
where recall the definition of (i;e)0 given in Section 2. Note that the right derivative
of uie(z) at z = 0 for i 2 N and e 2 E is equal to (i;e)0 .
Theorem 5 If uie (i 2 N; e 2 E) satisfy (34), then the allocation computed by
Simultaneous Monotone Algorithm coincides with the solution obtained by the
extended probabilistic serial mechanism Extended Random Assignment given in
[19]. In particular, under assumption (34) Simultaneous Monotone Algorithm out-
puts the probabilistic serial solution for the original assignment problem in [5].
(Proof) Under the assumption by Simultaneous Monotone Algorithm the amounts
of only the current top goods ei1 (i 2 N), one for each i, get increased uniformly. This
is exactly the procedure Extended Random Assignment of the (extended) proba-
bilistic serial mechanism. Note that k appearing in Step 1 of Extended Random
Assignment corresponds to k=0 for k appearing in Step 1 of Simultaneous
Monotone Algorithm. 2
The solution obtained by Extended Random Assignment can also be inter-







2 (i 2 N): (35)
For each i 2 N , corresponding to the preference order Li in (31), suppose that the
weights wi(e) (e 2 E) satisfy
wi(ei1) wi(ei2)     wi(eim) > 0: (36)
Here, for any a; b 2 R a  b means that a is sufficiently larger than b. Then
Problem P1 with u1 in (35) has an optimal solution x, which is as proportional
to w as possible. It follows from (36) that the optimal solution x is obtained by
lexicographically maximizing the sequence (x(e11); x(e
1
2);    ; x(e1m)) for x 2 B()







1(e12);    ; x(e1m)=w1(e1m)) (37)
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for all x 2 B(). Hence x is the optimal solution computed by what is called the
greedy algorithm of Edmonds [11] as
x(e1`) = (fe11;    ; e1`g)  (fe11;    ; e1` 1g) (` = 1;    ;m): (38)
It should be noted that from (38) sets fe11;    ; e1`g (` = 1;    ;m) are x-tight, so
that we have
x(fe11;    ; e1`g) = (fe11;    ; e1`g)  y(fe11;    ; e1`g) (` = 1;    ;m) (39)
for all y 2 B(). In other words, x is the maximum vector in B() with respect to
the (first-order) stochastic dominance relation associated with the preference order
L1 in (31).
Consequently, we may call the procedure Simultaneous Monotone Algorithm
for (35) and (36) a simultaneous greedy algorithm in the sense of Edmonds. We can
restate Theorem 3 as follows.
Corollary 2 Under the assumptions (35) and (36), for the output x  (xi j i 2 N)
of Simultaneous Monotone Algorithm, for each i 2 N the allocation xi is the one
obtained by the greedy algorithm of Edmonds on base polytope B(zi).
4.2 Quasi-order preferences
Katta and Sethuraman [27] considered the random assignment problem on the full
preference domain of quasi-orders, where we have a partition E i = fEi1;    ; Eikig
of E (into the indifference class of sets) for each agent i 2 N and the preference
order list Li on E i as
Li : Ei1 i    i Eiki : (40)
A special case of dichotomous preferences was considered earlier by Bogomolnaia
and Moulin [6]. Allowing indifference for goods, the problem with utility functions
can be reduced to a problem without indifference as shown in Section 3.3. For the
induced problem we can further apply the result of Section 4.1 to deal with the pref-
erence orders (40).
We can easily see that the output of Simultaneous Monotone Algorithm with
ui (i 2 N) modified in Section 3.3 coincides with the solution obtained by the prob-
abilistic serial mechanism of Katta and Sethuraman [27] (extended to the problem
with polymatroidal constraints).
This explains why the flow algorithms in [30,16,21] appear in the mechanism of
Katta and Sethuraman [27] (also [6]) as a subroutine.
4.3 Non-uniform shares
We have assumed that the total amount (E) of goods are uniformly distributed to all
agents, each receiving 0 = (E)=jN j of (E).





and that each agent i 2 N receives the total amount i0 of goods. Then we adapt
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the procedure Simultaneous Monotone Algorithm in such a way that the output
satisfies the requirement as follows.
We modify the definition (11) of (i; F; ) alone. Other definitions are the same
as in Section 3.2. For any i 2 N , F  E, and  with 0    1 define (i; F; ) to





Then Theorems 3 and 4 hold mutatis mutandis.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have presented a solution for the non-pricing allocation of divisible goods to
agents with utility functions and submodular constraints and showed the adaptabil-
ity of the probabilistic serial mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] to the non-
pricing allocation of divisible goods to agents with utility functions. Our results reveal
how the probabilistic serial mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] and its ex-
tensions [27,18–20] are related to the optimal fair allocation algorithms of Megiddo
[30], Fujishige [16], Gallo, Grigoriadis, and Tarjan [21], and Groenevelt [22] and to
the greedy algorithm of Edmonds [11]. This also shows that it is natural to consider
extensions of the original assignment problem to those with sets of available good
vectors expressed by submodular functions as in [18–20].
Apart from the submodular optimization views on the probabilistic serial mecha-
nisms, our simultaneous monotone algorithm can be employed as a non-pricing allo-
cation scheme when we are given such a fair allocation problemwith non-transferable
separable convex utility functions and submodular constraints to be solved. Then we
have to examine the computational complexity issue of our algorithm in more detail.
Also a game-theoretical issue remains to be investigated when every agent does not
necessarily reveal her utility function truthfully.
Although the models and goals are different, it is also worth mentioning that
there exist a lot of related researches on fair allocation problems such as those in
[1,2,8,9,13,14,31–34] among others. The submodular optimization views given in
the present paper are expectedly useful for further investigation of the models and
allocation schemes treated there.
Throughout the present paper the separability of utility functions plays a crucial
roˆle. How to deal with non-separable utility functions is also left open. It seems that
M\-convex functions ([35]) are good candidates for utility functions without separa-
bility in order to extend our allocation scheme appropriately, since separable convex
functions defined on independence polytopes (polymatroid polytopes) are M\-convex
(see [35–37,39] for more details).
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